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1.  Introduction. 
For  a  number  of  years  before  1989  central  eastern 
European  countries  had  been  facing,  to  various  extents, 
severe  domestic  and  external  imbalances,  economic  slowdown 
or  decline  and  the  need  to  restructure  production  capacity, 
wn.ile  attempting  to  reform  their  traditional  central 
planning  system  (see  Nuti,  1988).  These  problems  were  less 
intensely  felt  in  Hungary  and  Yugoslavia,  both  early 
starters on  the  road  to  reform,  relatively  free  from  endemic 
shortages  and  more  open  to  trade  with  the  West;  but  even 
there the  same  underlying  trends  were  present.  In the first 
half  of  1989  Gorbachev  1 s  perestroika  and  Soviet  economic 
debacle  led  to  Soviet  acquiescence  to  the  demise  of  the 
communist  party  in  Poland;  this  in  turn  triggered  off  a 
cascade  of  political  revolutions  in  the  other  central 
eastern European  countries  in the second half of the year. 
The  1989  revolutions  had  three  immediate  economic 
effects: 
- the  target model  of  economic  reform  switched  from  the 
search  of  a  market-oriented version  of socialism back  to the 
restoration  of  a  capitalist  economy,  with  dominant  private 
ownership  and enterprise; 
the  new  governments,  unlike  their  communist 
predecessors,  enjoyed  the  kind  of  political  legitimacy  and 
popular  support  necessary  to  undertake  unpopular  measures  of 
stabilisation; 
the  end  of  Soviet  rule  over  the  bloc  led  to  the 
speedy  collapse  of  CMEA  trade  arrangements  (with  formal  CMEA 
dissolution  in  September  1991),  which  imposed  greater 
opening  of  central  and  aastern  European  economies  and  the 
reorientation of their trade towards  the West. 
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The  new  political  conditions  and  the  precarious  state 
.·,f  these  economies  required  urgent  stabilisation  plans,  to 
J.)ut  an  end  to  shortages,  open  inflationary  pressures  and 
i~pending  debt  crisis;  radical  institutional  reform, 
~ncluding  for  the  fi~st  time  large  ~cale  privatisation; 
•pening  to  international  trade  and  finance;  these  were  also 
J'recondJ_·tlons  for  effo.ct  i ve  restructuring  of  productive 
:!apncity.  Former  political  obstacles to  these measures  were 
no  longer  pr~se.nt.  Thuf-t  a  wave  of  stabilisation and  reform 
r-rogr.rnnxr~s  ,c;uonort.ed  :by  loans  and  grants  from  international 
!raanisAtiors  and  western  countries,  were  introduced  in 
.,..?Pid  snt:'!cess:J.on  in  1989-91.  The  exceptions  were.  Hungary, 
whjch  cculd  continue with  a  gradualist approach  because  of  a 
;nuch  e~.rl.i...er  start.:  the  ex-GDR,  which  rapidly  achieved  the 
·;an.,f.'  tar'JPts  by  v·i:r.-t11e  of  German  reunification;  the  Soviet 
Union,  becRuse  of disastrous procrastination. 
When,  in  the  autumn  of  1989,  the  first  non-communist 
government  in  Poland  started preparing  its plan there  was  no 
precedent  for  the  simultaneous  undertaking~~stabilisation, 
systemic  transition  and  capacity  restructuring>~--~nd  on  such 
~  la.rgP  3;;;a le..  Tl'lerefore  it  was  natural  to  proceed  from 
fi.rst  principles  and  to  look  because  of  underlying 
hyperinflation  at  the  experience  of  Latin  American 
-~tabiliqation plans  in spite of their extremely poor  record. 
·rod~y,  however,  when  exploring  desirable  economic  strategies 
tor  the  further  progress  of  transition  in  the  whole  area, 
coere  is  no  justification  for  ignoring  the  performance  of 
6tabilisation  plans  to  date,  the  experience  of  transitional 
economies  which  for  any  reason  have  not  undertaken  such 
plans  (Hungary,  ex-GDR,  the  Soviet  Union  before  its 
jisintegration  at  the  end  of  1991),  as  well  as  that  of 
economies  further  East,  such  as  those  of  Vietnam,  China  and 
the  more  successful  South  East  Asian  countries.  This  paper 
is an  attempt at drawing  some  lessons  from  the  experience  of 
central  eastern  European  countries  in  1989-91  (on  Vietnam 
see  Kolodko  1990a,  Kolodko  et  al.  1992;  on  China,  Chen-
Jefferson-Singh  1990;  on  South-East  Asian  economies,  Fry-
Nuti  1992). 
2.  Gradualism  versus  speedy  transition:  Hungary  and 
the  ex-GDR. 
Hungary  and  the  ex-GDR  represent  unique,  extreme, 
opposite  patterns  respectively  of  gradual  and  instantaneous 
"transition",  which  could  not  be  followed  by  other 
countries. 
Hungary,  by  virtue of its early start with  the  1968  New 
Economic  Mechanism  (NEM)  and  better economic  conditions,  was 
~.ble  to  avoid  a  drastic  programme  in  1989-91  ·and  continued 
its  gradualist  strategy,  now  redirected  towards  the  new 
target model.  Its earlier achievements  provided  a  model  for 
the  other countries  in  a  number  of areas:  the transformation 
of  the  monolithic  monetary  and  banking  system  into  a  multi-
level,  competitive  and  pluralist  system;  the  liberalisation 
of  trade  and  foreign  investment;  the  development  of  an ~-- 3 -
articulated  tax  system,  replacing  diversitied  (ad  hoc  and 
often  enterprise-specific)  tax  and  subsidy  rates  wit.h 
uniform  rates  of  income  and  value-added  taxes;  th€.: 
development  of  financial  markets  first  for  bonds  then  fo:r· 
shares.  The  option  of  gradual  transforma·tlon,  however,  by 
1989-91  was  no  longer  open  to  the  other  countries:  the]"t 
domestic  and  (except  for  Romania)  external  imbalances  hac1 
cumulated  to  unsustainable  levels,  CMEA  had  disintegrated 
cutting them  off cheap  Soviet  supplies of oil  and materials, 
and  less  favourable  conditions  prevailed  in  international. 
trade  and  financial  markets,  with  respect  to  Hungary's 
position in the first years of NEM. 
The  ex-GDR  achieved  all  the  desired  goals 
(stabilisation,  systemic  transition,  opening  of  the  economy) 
at  once,  by  virtue of accelerated  reunification with  Federal 
Germany,  first  de  facto  then  de  jure  in  under  a  year  (see 
Siebert,  1990a  and  b;  Jackson,  1991a  and  b).  The  Ostmark 
overhang  was  partly  confiscated  partly  made  good  by  instant 
replacement  with  a  convertible  currency;  a  complete  new 
price  system,  body  of  legislation,  set  of  financiaJ 
institutions  were  imported  at  a  stroke;  the  economy  was  nor 
only  opened  but  also  joined  to  the  European  Community;  a 1·1 
these factors  facilitated privatisation. 
The  ex-GDR  transition  incurred  additional  costs,  with 
respect  to  other  countries,  because  of  the  rapid  growth  in 
real  wages,  which  caused  large-scale  unemployment.  This  was 
due  not  to  the  one-to-one  DM/Ostmark  rate  of  conversion  for 
wages,  as  it is often  believed,  as  this  only  had  a  once  and 
for  all  wealth  effect  actually  sustaining  demand  and 
employment;  unemployment  was  due  to  labour mobility,  started 
first  with  migrations  through  Hungary  then  through  the  gaps 
in  the  Wall,  and  totally  free  after  unification.  These 
additional  costs,  as  well  as  the  general  costs  of  such  a 
speedy  transition  and  restructuring,  were  born  mostly  by  the 
Federal  budget  and  German  financial  markets,  rather  than 
only  by  the  ex-GDR  population.  While  some  aspects  of  the 
German  experience  are  potentially  repeatable  in  other 
countries  (for  instance,  rapid  privatisation  through 
Treuhandanstalt),  neither  the  ex-GDR  transition  model  nor 
the  speed  of  its  implementation  are  repeatable  anywhere 
else. 
3.  stabilisation and  reform plans,  1989-91. 
The  first  stabilisation  plan  of  1989-90  was  introduced 
by  Yugoslavia  (1-12-1989;  see  Coricelli-Rocha,  1990).  This 
was,  however,  a  fairly  conventional  plan  (see  table  1), 
which  could  not  provide  a  model  for  the  other  countries. 
Yugoslavia  had  virtually  no  overhang,  already  had  a 
considerable  degree  of  economic  decentralisation,  fairly 
free  trade  and  a  nearly  convertible  currency,  experience 
with  restructuring  and  a  pool  of  labour  unemployment. 
Moreover  the  Yugoslav  programme  was  rapidly  aborted  in  mid-
1990,  because  of  republican  failure  to  comply  with  federal 
wage  guidelines  and  resulting  monetary  indiscipline  and -4-
pressure  on  the  exchange  rate;  convertibility  was  suspended 
de  facto  in  late  1990;  the  country  precipitated  into  civil 
war  in 1991. 
The  first  comprehensive  and  innovative  programme  for 
stabilisation  and  reform  was  the  Polish  plan  of  1-1-1990, 
associated  with  the  name  of  Finance  Minister  Leszek 
Balcerowicz.  It  included  broad  price  and  trade 
liberalisation,  nominal  anchoring  of  the  programme  to  money 
wages  and  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  targeting  the  real 
money  supply  and  real  interest  rates,  monetary  and  fiscal 
austerity,  large  devaluations  and  internal  convertibility, 
extreme  fiscal  pressure  on  the  state sector,  taxes  on  excess 
wage  increases  and,  in  the  longer  run,  privatisation  and 
capacity  restructuring.  The  Polish  stabilisation  plan  has 
provided  a  prototype  for  other  transitional  countries:  in 
1990-91  similar plans  were  introduced  in  Romania  (1-9-1990) 1 
Czechoslovakia  (now  known  as  CSFR,  or  Czech  and  Slovak 
Federal Republic,  1-1-1991),  Bulgaria  (1-2-1991). 
Meanwhile,  in  1989-91  the  Soviet  Union  continued  its 
inexorable  march  towards  repressed  and  open  hyperinflation, 
economic  disorganisation  and  supply  disruption,  republican 
disintegration  and  associated  drastic  falls  in  consumption 
and  output.  The  end  of  the  Soviet  Union,  accomplished  by 
the  August  1991  putsch  failure,  was  formalised  by  the 
creation  of  a  smaller  and  looser  Commonwealth  of  11 
Independent  States  (CIS;  SNG  from  the  Russian  initials) , 
established  by  the  Alma  Ata  and  Minsk  treaties  of  December 
1991  and  excluding  Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania  and  Georgia. 
This  paved  the  way  for  the unilateral  introduction  by  Russia 
of  a  stabilization  and  reform  programme  on  2  January  1992. 
The  programme  had  been  announced  by  Boris  Yeltsin  on  28 
October  1991  but  would  have  been  incompatible  with the  Draft 
Economic  Union  Treaty,  then  still  under  discussion,  which 
excluded  unilateral  price  increases  by  individual  republics. 
Implementation  was  originally  due  in  mid-December  but  was 
postponed  at  the  request  of  other  republics,  notably 
Ukraine;  a  second,  much  more  coherent  round  of  measures  is 
to  follow  in  April  1992.  Russian  price  liberalisation  has 
had  forced  all  the  other  ex-Soviet  republics  to  follow, 
because  of  the  continued  use  of  roubles  as  legal  tender  not 
only  within  CIS  but  also  in  the  rest  of  the  former  Union_: 
however  the  other  republics,  including  Ukraine,  are  very 
much  behind  on  their  way  to  a  new  system.  The  Russian 
package  has  a  great deal  in  common  with  the  Polish  prototype 
of  January  1990,  on  which  it is modelled.  However,  in  view 
of  the  speed  of  developments,  the  special  features  of  the 
ex-Soviet  area  (such  as  size,  the  persistence  of  a  rouble 
area  and  the  planned  introduction  of  republican  currencies, 
inter-republican  trade  and  payments  regime)  and  of  the 
Russian  programme,  we  shall  leave  it out  of  this  paper  (see 
Nuti  and  Pisani-Ferry,  1992). -5--
4.  The  Polish prototype. 
The  Balcerowicz  plan  envisaged  the  following  steps  (see 
Kolodko  1990a  and  1990b,  Nuti  1990a,  Rosati  1991a  and 
1991b) : 
i)  instantaneous  price liberalisation of  90  per cent  of 
transactions  and  a  reduction  of  government  subsidies  (from 
17  per  cent  of  national  income  in  1989  to  4  per  cent  in 
1991) ;  initially  some  budgetary  support  was  retained  for 
coal,  electricity,  gas,  state housing  rents,  heating  and  hot 
water,  transport  and  telecommunications,  pharmaceuticals; 
support was  reduced  for energy  in June  1990. 
ii)  a  balanced  state  budget  for  1990,  accompanied  by  a 
restrictive  monetary  policy  aimed . at  restoring  a  positive 
real  interest  rate;  interest  rates  were  raised  on  old  as 
well  as  new  credit contracts.  State enterprises assets  were 
revalued  on  average  by  a  factor  of  14  (and  again  in  1991), 
at  rates  differing  by  type  of  assets  but  uniform  throughout 
the  economy,  with  a  uniform  capital  tax  (called  a 
"dividend",  improperly  because it bore  no  relation to either 
current  profits  nor  reinvestment  requirements  of 
enterprises)  levied  on  revalued  state  assets.  Average 
turnover tax was  raised  from  10  to  20  per cent. 
iii)  wages  policy;  money  wages  were  set  for  January  on 
the basis  of  an  expected monthly  rate of  inflation of  45  per 
cent  in  January,  with  maximum  wage  guidelines  indexed  to 
prices  at  a  monthly  prefixed  rate  for  1990:  20  per  cent  of 
price  inflation  in  January,  30  per  cent  in  February  to 
April,  60  per  cent  in  the  rest  of  the  year  except  for  June 
(when  energy  prices  would  be  raised)  when  wage  indexation 
was  at  100  per  cent.  A  tax  on  wage  increases  over  these 
guidelines  (PPWW  or  "popiwek")  was  levied,  at  progressive 
rates  of  between  200  to  500  per  cent  of  excess  wages, 
exclusively on enterprises with state majority capital. 
iv)  unilateral  suspension  of  debt  service  from  1-1-90, 
soon  followed  by  formal  rescheduling  of  foreign  debt,  with 
interest  and  debt  amortisation  due  in  1990  postponed  to 
1991;  large  scale  debt  relief  was  granted  by  official 
creditors in April  1991. 
v)  zloty  convertibility  for  residents  and  for  current 
account  transactions;  following  the  devaluations  of  22  and 
28  December  on  1-1-1990  a  further  devaluation  of  the  zloty 
by  31. 6  per  cent  ( 4 3  per  cent  in  ten  days)  1 i fted  the  US 
dollar  to  9, 500  zlotys,  i.e.  practically  to  the  end-year 
free  market  rate  (the  black  market  for  foreign  exchange  had 
been  legalised  already  since  March  1989).  Domestic 
enterprises  could  buy  freely  at this rate to  finance  current 
imports;  households  could  buy  dollars  for  current  purposes 
(i.e.  not  to  invest  in  foreign  assets)  from  licensed  foreign 
exchange  "counters",  at a  floating  rate which  was  maintained 
very  close  to  the  official  rate.  A  US$  1  bn  loan  was  made 
available  by  the  G-24  to  support  convertibility,  in addition 
to  US$  700  mn  IMF  standby,  US$  300  mn  structural  adjustment ..  ~ 
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loan  from  the  World  Bank  (plus  additional  project  loans 
totalling  US$  780  mn  in  1990)  and  a  substantial  package  of 
aid  and  loans  from  the  EIB,  the  European  Community,  1.·c..s 
member  states  and  other  members  of  the  G-24;  there  was  an 
informal  commitment  to  maintain  the  rate  of  exchangE~ 
constant  until  May  1990,  but  this  was  not  taken  as  a 
performance  criterion.  In  the  event  the  rate  of  exchange 
was  maintained  until  mid-May  1991,  when  the  zloty  was 
devalued  by  17.4  per  cent  and  linked  to  a  basket  ,cf 
currencies  instead  of  the dollar;  in October  1991  a  crawling 
peg  regime  was  introduced,  with  a  maximum  monthl2· 
devaluation of 1.8 per cent. 
vi)  trade  liberalisation,  with  a  new  tariff  system 
·whose  average  incidence  was  12  per  cent,  followed  for  most 
goods  by  a  tariff  reduction  to  5  per  cent  (April)  or 
outright  suspension  (July);  the  elimination of  export  quotas 
(in January  and  in October  1990)  except  for  coal  and  a  small 
number  of  items  (though  20  commodities  were still subject to 
licences at the  end  of  1991),  and  automatic  authorisation to 
trade for all registered firms  whether state or private. 
vii)  an  undertaking  to  implement  further  institutional 
reform  in  the  direction  of  a  private  market  economy, 
including  the  development  of  banking  and  credit 
institutions,  competition,  privatisation  and  the 
introduction  of  financial  markets,  accompanied  by  capacity 
restructuring  in  the  medium  term.  A  spate  of  new 
legislation was  introduced  in  1990-91  to  implement  this part 
of  the  programme.  Following  extensive  debates  on 
privatisation  a  new  Law  was  adopted  in  June  1991  (see  Nuti, 
1990b);  small  scale  privatisation  (housing,  retail  and 
catering  establishments,  land)  was  to  be  followed  by  large 
scale  privatisation  of  state  enterprises;  however  this  side 
of the  programme  was  delayed  mostly  because  of  the  technical 
difficulties  of  implementing  mass  privatisation  (see 
Grosfeld-Hare,  1991).  This  was  to  take  place  through  the 
free  distribution  to  the  whole  adult  population  of 
entitlements  to  certificates  in  foreign-managed  investment 
funds,  but  their  establishment  was  postponed  to  late-1992; 
there  were  also  delays  due  to  the  complexities  of  property 
restitution  to  old  owners  (so-called  "re-privatisation", 
first  introduced  by  Germany  and  followed  throughout the  area 
except Yugoslavia). 
s.  Other  Polish-style plans,  1990-91. 
Table  1  summarises  the  main  features  of the  Polish  plan 
and  the  main  differences  with  respect  to  the  plans 
subsequently adopted by other countries. 
Romania  adopted  a  more  gradual  price  liberalisation  in 
three  stages,  beginning  on  15  November  1990,  1  April  and  1 
July  1991;  prices  increases  were  subject  to  three  months 
advance  notice  to  be  given  to  central  authorities.  The 
nominal  anchor  was  fixed  as  a  15%  increase  of  the  nominal 
money  supply.  A  special  fund  financed  out  of  a  10  per  cent (2) 
-7-
tax  on  enterprise  profits  was  set  up  for  the  purpose  of 
liquidating  interenterprise  arrears  (400  bn  Leu).  There 
were  no  provisions  for  wages  policy.  Convertibility  was 
supposed  to  be  introduced  on  27  September  1991  but  was 
postponed  in  the  absence  of  a  government  and  implemented  on 
11  November  under  a  "managed  float"  regime  (See  Romania 
Economic  Newsletter,  vol.  1,  n.  1,  2,  3,  1991). 
The  CSFR  took  in  1990,  ahead of the stabilisation plan, 
preparatory  measures  that  in  Poland  had  followed  the  plan, 
such  as  major  legislative  changes,  price  increases,  tax 
changes  (see  Hrncir-Klacek,  1991).  With  the  1991  plan 
convertibility  was  granted  to  enterprises,  excluding 
households;  even  for  enterprises  access  to  foreign  currency 
was  subject  in practice to considerable delays.  Small  scale 
privatisation  proceeded  fast  but  large  scale  privatisation, 
much  more  reliant  on  free  distribution  of  assets  to  the 
population,  has  been  greatly  delayed.  Inter-republican 
conflicts  between  the  Czech  and  the  Slovak  Republics  have 
characterised  the  CSFR  experience,  with  the  creation  of 
duplicate  Ministries  and  Agencies  at  the  federal  and  the 
republican  level,  and  the  difficulties  of  coo~inating 
fiscal  policy,  privatisation,  and  other  aspects  of 
stabilisation  and  reform.  Inter-republican  conflict,  though 
not  as  sharp  as  in  the  Soviet  Union/CIS,  the  Russian 
Federation  or  Yugoslavia,  has  been  a  brake  on  transition 
progress. 
The  Bulgarian  plan  was  perhaps  the  one  closest  to  the 
Polish  prototype,  however  with  more  gradual  trade 
liberalisation,  nominal  anchoring  to  the  money  supply, 
slower  privatisation  of  state  assets  (even  small  scale, 
except  for  land,  where  quick  progress  was  made).  The  lower 
real  wage  reached  after  price  liberalisation  was  stabilised 
and  strongly  indexed,  unlike  the  Polish  real  wage  guideline 
which  was  indexed  much  more  weakly  but  was  referred  to  the 
pre-stabilisation level.  (Angelov,  1992). 
6.  Economic  performance. 
The  main  indicators  of  macroeconomic  performance  in the 
five  central  eastern  European  countries  under  consideration, 
immediately  before  and  after  the  stabilisati'on  plans,  are 
summarised  in  Table  2.  Yugoslavia  is  atypical,  because  of 
both plan abortion and civil war. 
The  programmes  succeeded  in  establishing  market 
clearing  prices,  except  of  course  for  Romania  during  the 
intermediate  stages  of  price  liberalisation.  Inflati9n 
predictably  rose at first  (Romania  and  Bulgaria are still at 
that  stage)  but  was  brought  down  fairly  fast  in  ~oland  and 
even  faster  in the  CSFR  (with  price  stability  in the  summer 
1991)  although  it  is  still  subject  to  sudden  revamping. 
Fiscal  deficits  in  1991  (not  shown  in  the  table)  have  been 
higher  than  expected  because  of  a  lower  tax  basis\ for  the 
state  sector,  lower  tax  rates  and  lower  collection  rate  for -8-
the  private  sector,  higher  welfare  expenditures  made 
necessary by higher unemployment  and poverty. 
With  the  exception  of  Yugoslavia,  the  degrees  of 
convertibility  introduced  with  the  stabilisation  plans  were 
maintained.  Exports  in  convertible  currencies  rose,  mostly 
because  of  diversion  to  trade  to  Western  countries;  imports 
were cut often drastically. 
Everywhere  the  recession  of  1989  accelerated  in  1990 
and  continued  in  1991  and  1992.  The  collapse  of  CMEA  trade 
exacerbated  recession;  this  is  generally  regarded  as  an 
exogenous  shock  but was  actually the result of  a  deliberate, 
concerted  action  on  the  part  of  Soviet  trade  partners, 
seeking  economic  independence  in  spite  of  the  cost,  and 
refusing  to  maintain  CMEA  even  in  a  modified  form,  or  to 
establish  multilateral  clearing  arrangements  among  former 
members.  Soviet  economic  decline  was  another  contributory 
factor.  Thus  persistent  recession  was  at  least  partly 
unrelated  to  the  presence  or  the  intensity  of  the 
stabilisation effort. 
There  are  ongoing  debates  on  whether  the  depth  of 
recession  has  been  perhaps  overestimated,  due  to  the 
underrecording  of  the  growth  of  private  activities, 
including  a  "black"  or  "grey"  sector.  However,  given  the 
initial  low  weight  of  the  private  sector,  no  plausible 
allowance  for  such  a  possible  overestimate  is  bound  to  make 
a  difference to trends. 
Unemployment,  virtually  unknown  before  the start of the 
plans  (except  for  Yugoslavia),  rose  fast,  not  anywhere 
nearly  as  fast  as  output  reduction  but  faster  relatively to 
output than in western countries at times of recession. 
Prospects  for  1992  are  dim  everywhere  in  the  area: 
further  output  decline  or  stagnation,  and  further 
unemployment,  is  expected.  According  to  OECD  the  average 
GNP  decline  in .the  area  was  about  10  per cent  in  1991  and  is 
expected to continue at 2  per cent in 1992. 
A  number  of political  and  economic  lessons  can  be  drawn 
from  these experiences to date. 
7.  Political lessons. 
Economic  austeritv  reauires political  legitimacy.  and  a 
formal  or  informal  social  pact.  Under  a  communist 
government  in  Poland  a  modest  real  wage  cut of  8  per cent  in 
early  1988  was  followed  by  successful  street  protest  and 
overcompensatory  wage  claims,  ending  up  with  the  resignation 
of  the  Minister  who  had  taken  the  initiative,  Zdzislaw 
Sadowski,  and  an  increase  in  the  (statistical)  real  wage  of 
17  per  cent;  Balcerowicz  got  away  with  a  real  wage  cut  of 
one  third.  In  Bulgaria  the stabilisation plan  could  only  be 
introduced  under  a  coalition  government  and  a  non-communist 
President,  with  a  social  pact  with  the  Trade  Unions, --- 9  --
succeeding  where  the  former  government  had  failed. 
Hungarian  stabilisation,  though  slower,  also  relies  on 
social  accord  through  its  Council  for  the  Reconciliation  of 
Conflicts,  though  its  implementation  leaves  something  to  be 
desired..  Romania,  where  the  government  lacks  the  necessary 
popular  support,  is  lagging  behind.  The  best  contribut.inn 
that  a  communist  government  can  make  to  stabilisation is tn 
follow  Mieczyslaw  Rakowski's  example  and  to  take  unpopular 
decisions before resigning. 
Political  legitimacy  needs  a  local  (regionaL~ 
republican)  foundatign.  The  1989  revolutions  were  not  only 
anti-communist  but  a.lso  anti-centralist~  Centralisation  of 
economic  policy  dec is  .ions,  even  in  conditions  of  political 
pluralism  and  free  elections,  is  no  longer  acceptable.  This 
is  demonstrated  not  only  by  Yugoslav,  Soviet,  Russian  and 
Czech/Slovak  separatist  moves  but  also  by  ~he  autonomy 
acquired  de  facto  by  large  cities  and  small  regions 
especially in the ex-soviet Union. 
Economic  crisis  .J~.~--.. - .. nece$sary  up  to  a  point  -~q 
impose  consensus  on  drastic  measure~~  Protracted  and 
endemic  shortages,  inflation  and  hyperinflation  are  a  great 
problem  but  also  mollify  the  population  and  reduce  popular 
resistance  to  the  shock  therapy  of  an  austere  stabjlisation 
plan;  thus  governments  should  not  be  so  -r-eluctant  to  free 
prices  even  before  a  proper  stabilisat.ion  plan.  This  is 
also  confirmed  by  the  ~ugoslav  experience;  in  the  ex-USSR 
outside  Russia,  and  perhaps  in  Romania,  things  may  have  to 
get  worse  before  a  Polish-style  st.abilisat,ion  plan  can  be 
fully  implemented. 
Popular  support  for  austerity,  even  when  undertaken  by 
a  legitimate  government,  is short  lived~  Unpopular  measures 
should  not  be  spread  over  time  but  taken  as  quickly  as 
possible.  The  population  should  soon  be  able  to  perceive 
some  living  standard  improvement  after  the  fall;  if  a 
positive supply  response  is too  slow  or too  weak  to  allow  an 
early  reversal  in  consumption  trends  then  one  should 
deliberately  induce  a  worse  squeeze  than  strictly  necessary 
so  as  to  then  be  able  to  deliver  the  expected  and  pre-
announced  improvement  within  the  honeymoon  period,  after 
which  the  population will  stop being cooperative.  In  Poland 
this  period  lasted  roughly  200  days  and  in  other  countries 
the  honeymoon  is  unlikely  to  last  longer.  The  improvement 
has  to  be  sustainable;  "double-dips"  in  consumption  have 
adverse effects on  expectations. 
There  is  a  areat  danaer  of  populism  in  the  course  of 
stabilisation.  Populist  temptations  should  not  be 
tolerated;  on  the  contrary  they  should  be  discussed, 
identified,  publicised  and  specifically  rejected.  For  a 
start,  the  costs  and  risks  of  speeding  up  transition  and 
especially trade  liberalisation and  convertibility  should  be 
recognised  by  the  government.  In  particular,  unemployment 
should  not  be  underestimated  and  appropriate  provisions 
should  be  made  for  it:  belittling  the  costs  of -10-
stabilisation,  as  it was  done  in  Poland,  is  as  populist  a 
practice as the making of impossible promises. 
8.  Domestic macroeconomic  balance. 
Shock  therapy stabilisation can  bring  an  instant end  of 
§portages.  through  a  large  but  tolerable  hi.ke  in  prices, 
after  which  the  rate  of  inflation  can  be  brought  down.  2, 
This  may  now  seem  obvious  but  at  the  time  was  not  at  all 
clear in  Poland at the  end  of  1989,  in view  of  unprecedented 
features  of  that  stabilisation:  disequilibrium  relative 
prices  and  the  unknown  size  of  repressed  inflation,  which 
might  have  generated prolonged  chaos  instead  of  a  relatively 
orderly  bout  of  inflation;  the  combination  of  supply 
rigidities  and  the  possible  recreation  of  soft  budget 
constraints,  a  potential  recipe  fdr  protracted 
hyperinflation.  Purely  administrative  price  increases, 
below  the  market  clearing  level,  of  the  kind  introduced  by 
the  Romanian  government,  and  in the  Soviet  Union  by  Premier 
Valentin  Pavlov  on  2  April  1991,  arouse  popular  resistance 
and  discontent  without  eliminating  shortages;  they  may  have 
some  positive  effect  by  inducing  some  supply  response  from 
farmers,  reducing  shortages,  bringing  down  the  ratio  between 
black  and  official  exchange  rates,  but  otherwise  are 
counterproductive  in  that  they  generate  hostility  against 
market  reform. 
There  is  another  reason  why  all  price  increases  (and 
compensatory  payments)  should  be  made  all  at  one  go:  if 
price  increases  are  diluted  over  time  (as  they  were  in 
Romania,  through  three  stages  of  price  liberalisation;  to  a 
smaller  extent  in  Polanq)  the  consequences  are  inflationary 
expectations,  forward  looking  inflationary  wage  settlements, 
and  a  secondary  wave  of  inflation that  may  set  in  motion  an 
inflationary spiral. 
stabilisation  needs  prior  or  simultaneous  monetary  and 
fiscal  restraint.  Budgetary  and  monetary  discipline  is 
indispensable,  otherwise  the  round  of  price  increases 
involved  by  stabilisation  is  wasted,  and  inflationary 
pressures  are  continually  recreated.  Again,  this  may  seem 
obvious  enough  but  it  is  a  lesson  which  was  lost,  for 
instance,  on  Soviet  or  Romanian  leaders.  In  this  respect 
Janos  Kornai  has  been  proven  both  right  and  wrong:  wrong  ·in 
that  state  enterprise  budget  constraints  can  be  hardened, 
right  in  that  this  takes  a  non  communist  government  aiming 
at restoring a  private market  economy. 
~- Shock  therapy  stabilisation should  be  distinguished 
from  global  shock  therapy  a'  la  Dornbusch  ( 1990) ,  which 
would  include  also  instant  privatisation  through  free 
handouts  of  capital  to  citizen,  debt  for  equity  swaps, 
instant total  liberalisation of  trade  and  capital  movements, 
and  more;  and  from  the  actual  global  shock  therapy  followed 
in  Polish~type  programmes  which  include  free  trade  and 
convertibility as well  as stabilisation. - 11-
An  incomes  policy,  especially  for  workers  and  for 
farmers.  is  a  necessity.  In  view  of  the  underdeveloped 
monetary  and  financial  system,  monetary  policy  is not  enough 
to sustain  a  stabilisation programme,;  incomes  policy is also 
needed.  Untypically  this  was  recognised  for  Poland  also  by 
the  IMF;  the  same  principle  was  accepted  in  the  CSFR, 
Bulgaria  and  although  not  implemented  in  Yugoslavia 
(December  1989)  and  Hungary  (1991).  The  Romanian  and  (up  to 
the  Russian  1992  attempt)  Soviet  exceptions  are  a  further 
confirmation of this principle.  ~. 
Contrary  to  the  policy  followed  by  Poland,  farmers• 
incomes  should  not  be  penalised  but  protected  instead 
(everybody  else  does  it).  Their  loans  should  not  be  taxed 
(see  below)  but  subsidised;  they  should  not  be  charged 
international  prices  for  their  inputs  when  they  face  trade 
obstacles  in ·selling  their  output  at  international  prices 
and  are  facing  the  competition  of  subsidised  imports.~ 
Paradoxically  in  Poland  farmers'  supply  response  was  impeded 
by  competition  with  food  aid  granted  by  the  European 
Community  and other donors  in early 1990. 
9.  Monetary policy. 
Anchoring  a  oroaramme  to  real  money  supply  can  be 
inflationary;  anchoring  it  to  nominal  money  supply  can  be 
severely  recessionary.  Some  programmes  have  avoided  this 
dilemma  through  drastic  reductions  in  the  real  money  supply 
(Poland)  or  through  ambiguity  about  whether  money  targets 
were  nominal  or  real  (CSFR;  earlier Soviet  programmes  which 
were  not  implemented). 
Real  interest  rates  should  be  raised  but  not 
necessarily  to  oositive  levels  durina  stabilisation.  It is 
preferable  to  hold  down  interest  rates  initially, 
introducing  some  credit  rationing  instead.  In  a  growing 
economy  in  conditions  of  tranquillity,  of  course,  in 
equilibrium the  real  interest rate  has to match  the positive 
rate of  return  on  investment.  But  in the turbulent  times  of 
transition  a  positive  real  rate  of  interest  is  highly 
recessionary,  raises  the  burden  of  government  debt  service, 
and  is  probably  unnecessary,  as  even  a  negative  real  rate 
~.  On 
stabilisation 
Rocha,  1990. 
the  importance 
of  transitional 
of  incomes  policy  in 
economies  see  Coricelli 
the 
and 
~.  I  was  once  asked  (by  Gerhard  Fink):  why  should 
farmers  be  protected  ahd  not,  say,  barbers?  This  is  a  good 
question,  but  has  several  very  good  answers:  because  it is 
easier  to  grow  longer  hair  and  beard  than  to  go  without 
food,  because  haircuts  d.re  non  tradable  and  do  not  require 
tradables  for  their  production,  because  haircuts  are  not 
capital  intensive  services  both  in  terms  of  capital/output 
and capital/labour ratios. 12 
may  be  sufficient  to  induce  the  public  to  voluntarily  hold 
liquid  monetary  assets,  especially  in  a  situation  where 
interest  differentials  between  domestic  and  hard  currency 
deposits  are  greatly  in  excess  of  differential  inflation  or 
likely  domestic  devaluations.  If  tne  government  expects  to 
get  inflation  down  during  the  yea.1·.  it should  underpin  that 
expectation  by  lending  over  the  medium  term  at  interest 
rates  which  embody  that  expectat  i.on  of  lower  inflation  and 
therefore  lower  subsequent  moD'L.l'lY  rates  of  interest, 
instead  of  lending  mostly  on  var-·1.a.ble  monthly  rates  as  it 
was  done  i.n  Poland;  (on  pos~ible  perverse  real  interest 
effectsr  see Kolodko,  1990b and  l99t). 
In  no  circumstances  shoulJL~interest rates  be  raised  on 
QJ~~credit contracts stipulated at fixed  rates.  Retroactive 
high  interest rates are  a  tax  on  liabilities,  a  very  bad  tax 
which  nobody  has  ever  suggested~  Assets,  not  liabilities, 
should  be  subject to  tax~  The  increase  in net wealth  due  to 
a  drastic  fall  in  the  present  value  of  liabilities  may  be 
subject to  a  capital gains tax,  along with all kind  of  other 
capital  gains  not  liabilities  as  such.  Retroactive 
interest  rises  are  also  unfair  and  arguably 
unconstitutional;  they  were  disastrous  for  Polish  farmers 
and literally stopped their supply response. 
The  same  mistake  might  be  repeated  in  Bulgaria,  where 
raising  interest  on  old  contracts  has  been  seriously 
considered.  Hungarians  have  had  a  much  better  idea,  namely 
raising the  interest rate  on  enterprise  payment  arrears vis-
a-vis  other  enterprises  and  the  banking  system,  up  to  twice 
the  22%  basic bank  rate.  However  in  Hungary  in mid-1991  the 
marginal  cost  of  borrowing  to  enterprises  was  of  the  order 
30-40  per  cent  and  therefore  automatic  borrowing  at  44  per 
cent  through  cumulating  arrears  could  still be  preferred  to 
negotiated  borrowing  at  40  per  cent;  twice  the  actual 
borrowing rate would  be  a  preferable penal  stipulation. 
A  real  wage  level  lower  than  actual  (theoretical) 
levels.  and  consistent with  the  consumption  available during 
stabilisation.  should  be  strongly  indexed.  This  is  the 
policy which  was  followed  in Bulgaria.  A  weak  indexation  of 
the  actual  wage  level  - as  it  was  done  in  Poland  for  the 
determination  of  wage  norms  - produces  the  kind  of  U-shaped 
time  pattern  of  real  wages  that  occurred  in  Poland  in  1990. 
The  reversal  of  excessive  real  wage  falls  then  requires 
money  wages  rising faster  than prices,  but punitive  taxation 
of  excess  wages  above  government  guidelines  can  amplify  the 
resulting  wage  inflationary  shocks  by  raising  more  than 
proportionally  enterprise  labour  costs.  By  itself,  wage 
indexation  is  neither  good  nor  bad;  its  effect  depend  on 
what  wage  level  is  being  protected  (which  should  not  exceed 
what  is  allowed  by  sustainable  consumption  and  its 
distribution),  on  the  coefficient  of  elasticity  of  money 
wages  with  respect  to  prices,  on  the  lag  between  price  and 
wage  adjustments,  on  the  interval  between  wage  negotiations 
(when  real  wage  protection  ceases  to  be  automatic  and  money 
wages  become entirely subject to renegotiation anyway). -13-
10.  International aspects. 
Trade  liberalisation makes  an  imoortant  contribution to 
stabilisation  and  reform:  it  conveys  signals  of 
opportunities  for  a  more  efficient  pattern  of  imports  and 
exports,  it  "imports"  a  system  of  relative  prices  for 
tradables  which  otherwise  may  be  hard  to  settle  at  an 
equilibrium  level  following  domestic  liberalisation  of 
prices,  it  enhances  competition  in  an  over-concentrated 
industrial  system  during  the  time  it takes  to  partition it 
into  smaller  and  competing  units,  it  is  a  guarantee  of 
decentralisation  of  enterprise  decisions.  Free  trade  leads 
to  the  overdue  elimination  of  activities  which  would  have  a 
negative  value  added  at  world  prices  (which  according  to 
recent  empirical  studies  may  be  as  much  as  one  fifth  or  one 
quarter  of  industrial activities  in transitional  economies), 
and  therefore  facilitates  the  restructuring  process. 
However.  free  trade  destroys  also  domestic  activities  which 
are  unprofitable  at  world  prices  but  still  produce  a 
positive  value  added  and  make  a  positive  contribution  to 
national  income.  employment.  exports  and  consumption.  This 
cost  should  not  be  neglected  when  deciding  the  degree  of 
openness  of  the  national  economy  during  the  process  of 
stabilisation  and  transition  to  the  market  economy. 
Gradualism  in  stabilisation, ,ip.., got  economically  justified; 
gradual  ism  in  convertil?:iJ;  i ty~.1~llir~ trade  opening  until  some 
progress  is  made  in.  ,,,...ce,qp90il~  ..  restructuring  is  not 
necessarily unfounded  - as·~ong~as the  reform  impetus  is not 
lost on the way,  as it might·happen  in Hungary. 
There  is  a  contradiction  between  the  pursuit  of 
generalised  free  trade  and  the  will  to  ioin  a  tradina  bloc 
such  as  the  European  Community.  Inexplicably  this 
contradiction  was  little  understood  by  central  eastern 
European  governments  and  impeded  rapid  progress  in  the 
negotiation  of  association  agreements  with  the  EC  finally 
concluded  in  November  1991  by  CSFR  Hungary  and  Poland. 
Paradoxically  these  countries  have  had  to  reimpose  tariffs 
in  order  to  be  able  to  negotiate  their  reduction  in  trade 
with the EC. 
Internal  convertibility  for  current  transactions  is 
within  closer  reach  than  previously  thought.  One  of  the 
reasons  for  Polish  success  in this area  is the pre-existence 
of  hard  currency  denominated  assets  and  banknotes,  mostly 
dollars,  in  the  hands  of  households  and  firms  on  a  scale 
which  was  unique  in  Eastern  Europe  (at  1-1-90  of  the  order 
of  US$  4. 5  bn  for  households  deposits  plus  US$  2. 5  bn  for 
enterprises,  plus  cash  estimated at  between  US$  4  bn  to  US$ 
8  bn).  The  possibility of  early convertibility had  not  been 
at  all  clear  in  Poland  at  the  time;  indeed  many  economists 
had  warned  of  the  dangers  of  capital  flight  and  loss  of 
reserves,  whereas  the  opposite  happened.  This  does  not 
imply  that,  in  the  words  of  the  CSFR  Minister  of  Finance 
Vaclav  Klaus,  "The  only  problem  with  convertibility  is  to 
declare  it";  obviously  there  is  no  point  in  any  exchange 
rate  manoeuvre  unless  there  are  market-clearing  prices, - 14-
subsidies  have  been  eliminated  or very  subs~antially reduced 
on  tradable  goods  and  servicesr  and  there  is  significant 
elasticity of  demand' and  supply  with  respect  to  prices  (see 
Nuti,  1991).  In  Poland  the  simultaneous  price 
liberalisation  and  reduction  of  subsidies,  and  the  presence 
of  a  significant private  sector  and  the  hardening  of  budget 
constraints  in.  the  state  sector,  ensured  that  these 
preconditions were  satisfied  (as  they  were  in the  CSFR  on  1~ 
1-91  when  limited  convertibility  was  also  introduced, 
without  a  private sector  and  therefore  with  more  limitations 
than  in Poland) . 
In  heavilY~  __ j_ndebted  countries  the  rescheduling  of  debt 
and  capitalisation of  interest,  whether  de  jure or de  facto, 
are  a  clear  precondition  for  establishing  convertibility. 
Convertibility  is  immensely  facilitated  by  the  lack  of 
externally held  balances  in domestic  currencies  (such  as  the 
sterling  balances  which  marred  British  early  attempts  to 
return  to  convertibility).  However  convertibility  is 
impossible  without  the  freezing,  or  funding,  or  outright 
relief,  of  externally  held  debt  denominated  in  hard 
currencies.  Poland  first  rescheduled  unilaterally,  then 
came  to  agreed  rescheduling,  then  benefitted  from  debt 
relief.  Hungarians,  pursuing  convertibility  under  the 
burden  of  debt  service,  have  faced  great  difficulties  and 
have not yet established it. 
Debt  rescheduling  and  relief should  be  requested  before 
and  not  after  stabilisation.  In  the  interest  of  the 
stabilising  country,  in  order  to bargain  from  a  position  of 
strength,  the  easing  of  the  burden  of  debt  should  be  made  a 
negotiated  condition  for  the  introduction  of  convertibility 
and  trade  liberalisation;  even  after  a  very  successful 
stabilisation  such  negotiations  are  held  from  a  position  of 
weakness.  This  is  demonstrated  by  Poland's  delay  in 
obtaining  debt  relief  and  its  uneven  treatment  by  different 
creditors. 
11.  Exchange  rate policy 
Some  undervaluation  of  the  domestic  currencv  and  a 
commitment  to  initially  support  a  fixed  rate  are  necessary 
to  establish  credibility  of  convertibility.  Through 
inflation  continuously  revaluing  a  nominally  constant, 
initially undervalued  zloty rate of  exchange  for the dollar, 
the real  price of the dollar starts high  and  is continuously 
reduced  in  a  kind  of  repeated  Dutch  auction  until  it  finds 
its  own  equilibrium  level,  signalled  by  the  nominal  rate  of 
exchange  coming  under  pressure.  Credibility  of 
convertibility  with  respect  to  domestic  holders  of  dollars 
as  well  as  foreign  and  domestic  firms  is· initially  low,  but 
it  grows  as  convertibility  is  maintained.  This  gradual 
credibility  enhancement  allowed  real  appreciation  of  the 
zloty  in  1990-91,  which  would  not  have  occurred if the  zloty 
had  been  -initially  set  at  a  higher  rate.  Then  the 
equilibrium  rate  can  rise  over  time  because  of  increasing 
confidence  - up  to  the  limits  set  by  trade  competitiveness. (3) 
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Yugoslavia  fixed  a  realistic  rate  of  exchange  which  however 
could not  be  maintained  - among  other reasons  - also because 
it was  not  undervalued 2i  there is no  point  in  introducing  a 
convertibility  which  cannot  be  maintained,  especially  if 
there  is  a  misguided  commitment  to  fixed  rates.  An  initial 
commitment  to  a  fixed  rate  also  enhances  credibility  (see 
Aghevli et al.,  1991). 
Undervaluation  of  the  domestic  currency  may  have  to  be 
-w·ell  below  Purchasing  Parity  Parities.  In  any  case  PPP  is 
not  a  good  guidance  to  initial  rate  for  three  reasons:  the 
equilibrium  rate  is affected  by  stock  equilibrium,  which  in 
Polish-type  conditions  may  require  a  lower  rate  than  flow 
equilibrium;  PPP  includes  non  tradables;  more  importantly, 
PPP  is  an  average  concept  whereas  competitiveness  is  a 
marginal  one,  i.e.  what  counts  is the elasticities of  supply 
of and  demand  for tradables. 
Notwithstanding  the  need  for  some  undervaluation  of the 
domestic  currency  for  the  sake  of  credibility.  the  price  of 
hard  currencies  should  not  be  pitched  as  high  as  the  level 
prevailing in the  free  market.  The  free  price in  a  two-tier 
freejcontrolled  market  is  always  higher  than  the  single 
price which  would  prevail  in  a  completely  free  market.  Some 
undervaluation  is  necessary  but  excessive  undervaluation  is 
expensive  because  it  leads  to  distress  exports  and  it 
worsens  terms  of  trade.  Excessive  undervaluation,  such  as 
necessarily  involved  in  officially  adopting  the  free  market 
rate,  unnecessarily  raises  domestic  inflation and,  under  the 
kind  of  wages  policy.  followed  in  Poland,  unnecessarily 
reduces real wages  ~;  thus it is to be avoided. 
The  nominal  exchange  rate.  in  any  case,  is  a  bad  anchor 
if  further  inflation  is  expected  and  moreover  cannot  be 
controlled.  This  is  what  happened. in  Poland;  the  ensuing 
progressive  revaluation  to  the  point  of  gross  overvaluation 
- partly the result of  inflation generated  by  undervaluation 
itself  was  as  unfounded  as  the  initial  excessive 
undervaluation  and  required  further  (still  inadequate) 
corrections.  The  later a  new  devaluation then  occurs,  as it 
eventually  must,  the  larger  it has  to  be,  probably  raising 
,2.  In  addition,  of  course,  Yugoslavia  was  forced  to 
suspend  convertibility  de  facto  in  the  Autumn  of  1990 
because  by  mid-1990  it had  lost  control  of  money  wages,  of 
monetary  expansion  and  of  republican  contributions  to  the 
federal  budget. 
~- Gomulka  (1991b)  rejects the notion that the January 
devaluation  was  excessive  on  the  ground  that  in  December 
1989  in  Poland  nearly  60  per  cent  of  the  total  money  supply 
was  dollar-denominated,  and  therefore  devaluation  did  not 
amount  to  a  contractionary  monetary  policy.  However  he 
neglects  that  wages  were  not  dollar-denominated,  and  that 
the  inflationary  implications  of  the  January  devaluation 
unduly  depressed  real  demand  through  real  incomes  if  not 
through real balances. -16-
inflation  and  inflationary  expectations  more  than  a  series 
of  smaller  adjustments.  A  combination  of  real  wage  policy 
and  floating  exchange  rate  (as  in the  Bulgarian  programme  of 
February  1991)  or,  better,  some  kind of crawling  peg,  appear 
to be preferable 2· 
It  is  absurd  to  pre-announce  devaluations.  This  was 
done  in Czechoslovakia  in mid-1990  for  1-1-1991  thus  forcing 
an  earlier  devaluation  in  September  1990,  in  Romania  for 
August  1991  and  practically  in  Hungary  with  the  January 
devaluation  which  had  been  openly  called  for  by  government 
members;  but  prior  indication  of  general  exchange  rate 
policy is far better than maintaining  an  overvalued  currency 
until a  crisis occurs. 
12.  Privatisation 
Privatisation  takes  a  great  deal  of  time  to  be 
implemented  and/or  to  become  effective.  We  already  know 
from  the  privatisation  experience  of  Western  countries  that 
the  preparation  of  state _enterprises  for  sale  and  the  issue 
of  shares  to  the  public  is  a  lengthy  process  (see  for 
instance the  British experience).  The  transfer of  ownership 
titles can  be  speeded  up  by  the  free  distribution of  claims 
to  state  assets  to  the  population,  as  envisaged  everywhere 
except  the  ex-GDR  and  Hungary.  This  in  fact  may  eliminate 
or at least reduce  the  need  for prior financial  and  capacity 
restructuring,  capital  valuation  and  share  issue  pricing. 
However  the  organisation  of  even  such  "free"  transfers  has 
proven  inordinately  time  consuming  in  practice,  and  has  not 
yet  been  implemented  in  any  of the transitional  economies  in 
spite  of  earlier  commitments.  In  any  case  the  simple 
transfer  of  ownership  titles  has  no  effect whatever  - other 
than  an  undesirable  inflationary  wealth  effect  on  demand  -
in  the  absence  of  properly  functioning  financial  markets: 
for  managers  to  be  subject  to  stock  market  discipline it is 
necessary  for  them  to  feel  the threat of takeover  in case  of 
poor  performance.  Restrictions  on  voting  and  on  early 
2·  Aghevli  et  al.  (1991)  discuss  the  relative  merits 
of  fixed  and  flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  in  developing 
countries.  On  the  one  hand  a  commitment  to  manage  the 
exchange  rate  flexibly  may  provide  helpful  assurances  to 
producers  of  traded  goods  and  thereby  support  external 
adjustment;  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  undermine  the 
credibility of  the  government  in adopting  restrictive demand 
policies  and  thus  make  it more  difficult to  lower  inflation 
without  imposing  an  output cost.  On  balance,  they  recommend 
a  nominal  exchange  rate  rule,  under  which  the  rate of  crawl 
of  the  nominal  exchange  rate  is  fixed.  Following  this  line 
of  reasoning it was  effective  for  Poland to maintain  a  fixed 
nominal  rate  for  an  initial  extended  period,  to  establish 
credibility,  but  the  continuation  of  such  policy  after 
credibility  had  been  established  will  have  had  advantages 
outweighed  by  disadvantages  with  respect  to  exchange  rate 
flexibility. -17-
resale of  shares,  and  the pulverisation of shareholding,  are 
a  guarantee  that  financial  markets  will  not  be  able  to 
exercise  a  function  of  corporate  control  for  a  iong  time  to 
come. 
Privatisation.  because  of  its  necessary  slowness. 
should  not  be  relied  upon  as  a  way  of  easing  the  task  of 
stabilisation.  "Small  scale"  privatisation  (housing, 
catering  and  trade  establishments,  land)  can  be  much  quicker 
than  the  privatisation  of  state  enterprises,  but  even  that 
cannot  soften  the  blow  of  instant  price  liberalisation, 
unless  it starts  beforehand  and  its progress  is clearly  and 
credibly  announced  in all its details.  It follows  that  the 
Shatalin-Yavlinsky  Plan  of  September  1990  for  Soviet 
stabilisation  in  500  days  was  not  credible,  because  of  its 
attempt  to  reduce  the  overhang  through  front  loaded 
privatisation.  Soviet  reform  attempts  of  end-1990/early 
1991  failed  not  because  privatisation  per  se  was  not 
introduced,  as  Jeffrey  Sachs  argues  (in  Repubblica,  8  March 
1991),  but  because  privatisation  was  relied  upon  as  an 
instrument of stabilisation - already  a  tall order  - and  was 
not  replaced  by  other  stabilisation  measures  such  as  higher 
prices or taxes. 
Prooerty  restitution  to  old  owners  is  a  respectable 
political  objective  but  is  economically  costly. 
Restitution,  introduced  everywhere  following  the  ex-GDR 
lead,  is  not  economically  necessary  to  build  up  confidence 
in  the  new  institutions,  since  there  is  no  expectation  of 
policy  reversals  in  the  target  system.  It  slows  down 
further  the  process  of  privatisation  because  of  the  time 
needed  to  allow  and  process  claims,  especially  if 
restitution  in  kind  is  contemplated.  It  also  absorbs 
precious  time  to  settle  a  large  number  of  issues:  the 
eligibility  of  nationals  versus  expatriates  (and  from  what 
date),  the  fixing  of  ceilings  and  progressive  scales  for 
compensation  (always  confiscatory  on  a  progressive  scale  - a 
residual  of  socialist  egalitarianism);  the  fixing  of 
arbitrary  dates  from  which  nationalised  property  is  to  be 
returned  to  old  owners,  and  often  of  specific  nationalising 
laws  and  types  of  property.  Restitution  to  old  owners, 
including  aristocrats  and  the  Churches,  at  a  time  when 
considerable  sacrifices  are  asked  of  ordinary  citizens  and 
workers,  is politically divisive.  These  economic  costs  may 
be  regarded  by  the  governments  involved  as  worth  paying  (in 
Hungary,  restitution  was  a  condition  of  the  Smallholders' 
Party  essential  participation  in  the  government  coalition), 
but should not  be neglected. 
The  state  sector.  which  in  the  necessarv  delavs  of 
privatisation  continues  to exist  and  to  provide  the  bulk  of 
productive  capacity.  should  not  be  ignored.  neglected  and 
penalised.  Central  eastern  European  governments, 
particularly  the  Polish  government,  confuse  their  potential 
ability to  privatise  with  the  realisation  of  that  potential -18-
and  simply  pretend  that  the  state  sector  does  not  exist.  ~ 
Worse,  state  enterprises  are  in  Poland  subjected  to 
distortionary  and  discriminatory  taxation  with  respect  to 
the  private  sector,  such  as  the  tax  on  wage  payments  above 
statutory guidelines  (the  so-called  PPWW)  and  a  payment  of  a 
so-called  "dividend"  to  the  state  budget  calculated  not  on 
profits  but  on  a  revalued  historical  capital  value;  similar 
policies  are  followed,  to  a  lesser  extent,  in  the  other 
countries.  It  is  inappropriate  to  enforce  incomes  policy 
only  in  the  state  sector;  a  generalised  progressive  income 
tax  is  preferable.  The  argument  of  lack  of  owners'  control 
over  wage  expenditures  in  the  state  enterprises  is  used  in 
support of  excess  wage  tax in Poland  and  Hungary  but this is 
a  case  for  privatisation  and  for  the  overhauling  of 
managerial  incentives  in  the  state  enterprise  sector,  not 
for tax exemption of the private  sector.~ 
On  the  rebound  from  former  "soft  budgets"  state 
enterprises  are  indiscriminately  starved  of  resources, 
whether  from  the  reinvestment  of  profits  or  access  to 
credit,  regardless  of  the viability of potential  investment. 
Under  the  prospect  of  a  rapid  privatisation  which  does  not 
however  materialise,  there  is  hardly  any  reorganisation, 
redeployment  of  productive  assets  within  the  state  sector, 
revision  of  methods  of  assessing  and  rewarding  managerial 
performance.  Managerial  uncertainty  about  the  prospect, 
timing  and  terms  of  their  enterprises'  privatisation  leads 
at best to paralysis,  at worst  to de-capitalisation,  anarchy 
and  rapid  decline.  This  kind  of  policy  is  not  necessarily 
an  improvement  on  the  former  central  tutelage  10.  The  only 
incentive  for  efficient managerial  behaviour  is the  prospect 
of  finding  a  foreign  buyer  or  partner,  and  this  is  not 
general  enough  or,  apart  from  exceptions,  strong  enough  to 
vitalise state enterprises. 
Under  the  old  system  state  enterprises  were  basically 
administrative  units  executing  central  instructions  and 
rewarded  or penalised according  to the  degree  of  fulfillment 
of  such  instructions.  This,  however,  does  not  necessarily 
~.  In  this  the  new  governments  display  the  same  kind 
of  attitude  that  the  old  regime  had  with  respect  to 
inflation,  confusing  their  potential  ability  to  implement 
price  stability with  the  realisation  of  that  potential,  and 
ignoring  the  cumulative  build-up  of  the  large  monetary 
overhang which played such  a  great part in systemic failure. 
~.  Polish  government  documents  (for  instance  the 
Government  Memorandum  of  25  March  1991,  section  IV.1) 
candidly  recognise  that  the  "popiwek"  tax  is  "expected  to 
provide  a  significant  incentive"  for  privatisation.  Surely 
this  kind  of  incentive  should  not  be  needed,  or  less 
distortionary incentives could be provided. 
10.  On  the  negative  perception  of  the  Polish 
stabilisation  programme  by  managers,  from  a  sample  of  70 
state enterprises,  see Maj  1991. - 19  ~-
imply  lack  of  "entrepreneurship"  on  .the  part  of  managers; 
indeed  it has  been  argued  that  the  task  of  running  a  state 
enterprise  in  the  face  of  continuous  unpredictable  changes 
in  often  conflicting  central  instructions,  in  conditions  of 
endemic  shortages  of  labour  and  means  of  production  and 
uncertain  supplies,  is  a  much  harder  challenge  than  that 
faced  by  western  managers  running  a  private  enterprise  in  a 
market  economy.  The  problem  is  not  the  absence  of 
entrepreneurship  but  the  misdirection  ' of  whatever 
entrepreneurship  is  there.  There  are  signs  that  state 
enterprises  have  actually  responded  to  some  extent· to  the 
new  conditions;  a  pilot  study  of  Polish  state  enterprises 
conducted  by  the  World  Bank  (Jorgensen  et  al.,  1990) 
concludes  that  "in  the  light  of  the  immense  and  continued 
uncertainty  and  the  time  necessary  for  adjustment,  the 
degree  of  response  observed  was  high,  and' in  most  cases  in 
the  right  direction".  However,  some  of  this  response  had 
negative  side  effects  (for  instance,  the  growth  of  inter-
firm  payments  arrears,  which  firms  exp~cted  to  be  somehow 
guaranteed  by  the  state) ;  excess  wage  tax  , proved  to  be 
constraining  output  and  generating  distortions;  firms 
suffered  from  a  "vacuum  of  ownership";  "the  best-placed 
firms  are  probably  those  with  previous  exposure  to  selling 
on  Western  markets".  It is urgent to provide  new  indicators 
of  enterprise  performance,  budgetary  constraints  (e.g.  cash 
limits)  and  an  appropriate  system  of  managerial  incentives 
(rewards  and penalties geared to market success). 
Especially  in  the  state  sector  some  capacity 
restructuring  should  be  steered  from  the  start,  following 
the  kind  of  industrial  policy  which  is  usually  formulated 
and  implemented  in all  other  market  economies.  When,  as  in 
Poland  in January-March  1991,  enterprise profits are  subject 
to  87  per  cent  taxation  and  access  to  credit  is  restricted 
in  principle,  there  can  be  no  supply  response  from  any 
stabilisation programme. 
13.  sequencing,  announcements,  contingencies. 
Speedy  action  is  better  than  orderly  procrastination. 
In  recent  literature  there  has  been  considerable  discussion 
of  the  question  of  appropriate  sequencing  of  reform  and 
stabilisation  steps:  some  have  pointed  out  the  high  degree 
of  interdependence  of  tasks  and  therefore  the  need  to  do 
everything  at  once  (e.g.  Dornbusch  1990);  others  have 
attempted  to  draw  a  desirable sequential  critical path  (e.g. 
Nuti,  1991b) .  ·There  is  now,  however,  widespread  agreement 
that,  whatever  the merits  of  a  possibly potentially superior 
critical  path  it is  much  more  important  to  move  as  fast  as 
possible  "meandering"  in  the  right  direction  than  to  make 
slower  progress  along  a  sequentially  optimal  path,  even  if 
it  existed.  Clearly  stabilisation  must  come  first,  as 
market  clearing  prices  without  excessive  inflationar:y 
pressures  are  a  precondition  of  viability  of  an~  system 
where  markets  are  used  at  all,  even  if  only  for  the 
distribution of  resources  and  not  their allocation as  in the 
traditional  centrally  planned  economy.  Currency 
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convertibility without  price liberalisation  (even  solely  for 
the  tourist  rate,  as  it  was  done  in  the  Soviet  Union  in 
November  1991)  unloads  the  monetary  overhang  onto  that  one 
market  and  leads  to  costly  and  absurd  results  (such  as  a 
Soviet  average  wage  of  the  order  of  US$  3  per  month).  But 
it  is  essential  that  central  eastern  European  governments 
should  not  stop  after  stabilisation  wondering  what  is  best 
to  do  next,  and  should  keep  going.  In  Poland  institutional 
reforms  practically  came  to  a  standstill  in  the  first  half 
of  1990  for  a  considerable  time,  while  privatisation  was 
unnecessarily  delayed  by  political  arguments  and  by  the 
pursuit  of  facile  schemes  of  mass  privatisation.  Without 
such  gaps  and  delays  the  expected  supply  response  might  have 
been  stronger.  Of  course  complex  and'unprecedented  systemic 
reform  is  bound  to  take  time;  but,  confronted  with  such 
delays,  it  may  be  better  to  follow  the  line  of  least 
resistance  and  implement  what  is  immediately  feasible, 
rather  than  follow  a  rigid  ideal  pattern  of  reform 
sequencing:  bad  sequencing may  be better than no  change. 
Even  incomplete  and  unsuccessful  attempts  at  reform  mav 
have  positive  effects.  It  has  been  claimed  that  such 
attempts  have  brought  about  "reform  fatigue";  certainly  the 
repeat~d pre-1989  aborted  attempts  at  constructing  a  market 
socialist  ·model  must  have  worn  out  all  those  involved. 
However  even  failed  attempts  are  not  necessarily  a  waste  of 
time.  It helps  stabilisation to have,  beforehand,  a  private 
sector  in  agriculture  and  in  manufacturing;  some  free  trade 
in  foreign  currency,  currency  retentions  by  exporters  and 
currency  auctions  (admittedly  distortionary,  but  a  powerful 
instrument  of decentralisation and  an  incentive to trade);  a 
previous  banking  reform,  legislation  of  the  kind  already 
passed in Poland under Jaruzelski,  even under Martial  Law. 
In  the  delay  of  implementation  the  effects  of  time-
consuming  measures  can  be  approximated  by  making  credible 
and  detailed  announcements.  Thus,  for  instance,  the effects 
of  a  necessarily  slow  privatisation  programme  - on  saving 
behaviour,  on  incentives  - can  be  accelerated  by  announcing 
the  exact  terms,  schedule  and  procedures  of  the  entire 
programme.  However,  this  presumes  that  the  path  to  be 
followed  is clear and  widely  agreed,  and  that the  government 
enjoys  credibility  when  it  announces  what  it  intends  to 
undertake  next.  Policy  reversals  or  even  continuous 
piecemeal  alterations  within  the  same  general  policies 
undermine  such credibility. 
Instead  of  adopting  a  single  package  of  stabilisation 
measures.  the  government  should  make  contingent  commitments 
to  cover  possible undershooting  or overshooting.  and  some  of 
the  possible  additional  external  shocks.  A  single  package 
could  not  possibly  be  "robust"  enough  with  respect  to 
exogenous  factors  and  to  unpredictable  behavioural 
responses.  Once  a  package  is  announced,  if  external  or 
domestic  conditions  change  in  an  expected  direction  the 
government  is  paralysed,  for  fear  of  destabilising 
expectations  by  taking  necessary  action.  For  instance  the 
Polish  government  could  not  react  to  the  recessionary -21-
overshooting  of  its stabilisation plan  in  1990,  fearing  that 
reflationary  measures  would  signal  the  abandonment  of  its 
commitment  to  austerity.  Only  the  prior  announcement  of 
contingent  measures,  at  the  same  time  as  the  stabilisation 
was  announced,  could  have  avoided  keynesian  unemployment, 
which  is  not  as  justified  as  the  unemployment  generated  by 
capacity restructuring. 
14.  system specific features  of stabilisation. 
Post-communist  countries  are  different  from  ordinary 
ypderdeveloped  countries;  hiah  costs  can  derive  from 
neglecting  such  differences.  In  the  elation  of  1989 
revolutions  the  prospect  of  an  early  transition  to 
capitalism  induced  new  rulers,  international  agencies, 
western  governments  and  their  advisors  to  forget  the  heavy 
burden of the  former  regime's  legacies.  Not  only  were  older 
historical  legacies  initially  neglected  - nationalist  and 
ethnic  conflicts,  to  name  only  the  ones  which  most 
spectacularly  manifested  themselves  soon  afterwards  - but 
also  the  more  recent  but  deeply  ingrained  economic  legacies 
of habits,  institutions,  expectations. 
By  and  large  central  eastern  European  economies  have 
been  treated  like  ordinary  developing  countries,  facing 
familiar  tasks  of  de-regulation  of  economic  activities, 
privatisation  of  state  assets,  coping  with  a  large  external 
debt,  trying  to  bring  down  inflation  and  hyperinflation, 
opening  their  economies  to  trade,  attracting  new  foreign 
investments.  The  skills  of  area  studies  specialists  and  of 
economists  expert  in  centrally  planned  economies  and  their 
long path to reform  were  regarded  as  obsolete.  Knowledge  of 
the  target  model  was  regarded  as  the  only  necessary 
qualification to manage  the transition to that model. 
Qualitatively  the  tasks  of  transition  are  the  same  as, 
or  similar  to,  those  familiar  from  the  experience  of 
underdeveloped  countries.  But  one  might  be  forgiven  for 
quoting  Engels'  proposition  that  quantitative  differences 
can  become  qualitative  (Anti-During):  the  sheer  scale  of 
these tasks,  as  well  as their simultaneous presence,  reduces 
very  greatly  the  relevance  of  the  stabilisation  and  reform 
programmes  of  underdeveloped  countries  to  central  eastern 
Europe.  Moreover,  the  ultimate  difference  between  the  two 
groups  was  neglected  or  underestimated:  namely,  the 
extraordinary  economic  inertia  of  a  centrally  planned 
economy  no  longer  subject  to  ce.ntral  control  but  not  yet 
fully subject or responsive to, full market stimuli. 
There  is  an  inordinate  dif.ference ·between  reducing  the 
size  of  the  state  sector,  say  from  60  to  30  per  cent,  and 
reducing it from  100  to  50  per cent;  for  a  start,  one  has to 
introduce  from  scratch  property  legislation,  joint  stock 
companies,  commercial  banking,  financial  markets,  price 
competition,  liquidation  and  bankruptcy;  legislation  takes 
time,  jurisprudence  a  much  longer  time.  There  is  the  same 
difference  between  raising  unemployment,  say,  from  5  to  10 -22-
per  cent  and  raising  it  from  zero  to  over  10  per  cent; 
between  liberalising  some  price  controls,  and  replacing  with 
market  clearing  prices,  a  historical  stratification  of 
multiple  prices  varying  according  to  agents  and  type  of 
transactions;  between  introducing  convertibility  for  a 
domestic  currency  and  introducing  a  true  domestic  currency 
in  place  of  what  was  essentially  a  unit  of  account  or,  at 
best,  a  lottery ticket.  The  list could  go  on.  The  neglect 
of these  differences  had  led to a  serious  underestimation of 
the  time  scale  of  transition  and  of  the  costs  of  a 
transitional  economic  non-system,  and  to  a  serious 
overestimation of  the  supply  response that could be  elicited 
through  familiar policy instruments  in an  inert economy  11. 
15.  Costs  and benefits. 
The  benefits  expected  of  stabilisation  and  reform  need 
not  emphasising:  the  viability  of  markets,  which  for 
consumers  means  a  return to  "normal  life"  (a  theme  which  has 
frequently  recurred  in  electoral  campaigns)  and  for  firms 
the  elimination  of  the,most  glaring  inefficiencies;  the  de-
politicisation  of  economic  activities;  the  establishment  of 
market  discipline  for  enterprises  and  personal  incentives 
for  individuals;  a  return  to  the  world  economy  and  in 
particular to  Europe;  the  expectation of  better standards  of 
living. 
The  list  of  expected  benefits  is  long  but,  when  there 
is  no  alternative  course  of  action  the  benefits  of  the  only 
course  do  not  even  need  to  be  mentioned,  let  alone 
quantified.  There  remains  however  a  problem  of  cost-
effectiveness  of  alternative  ways  of  taking  the  same  course 
of  action  (i.e.  not  a  question  of  what  to  do  but  of  how  to 
do  it). 
The  stabilisation  and  reform  plans  of  central  eastern 
European  countries  have  been  accompanied  by  inordinately 
high  costs,  in  terms  of  employment,  output,  consumption, 
distribution of  income  and wealth. 
Some  of  those  costs  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
transition  to  market  but  are  simply  the  open  manifestation 
of  the  hidden  costs  of  the  earlier  system:  hidden 
unemployment  a,nd  inflation,  environmental  disaster, 
inappropriate  capacity;  such  costs  would  have  been  openly 
incurred,  sooner  ,or  later,  whatever  the  target  model 
selected. 
Some  of  the  costs  have  been  the  result  of  the 
uncoordinated  nature  of  stabilisation  and  reform  plans 
undertaken  in  the  whole  area,  which  have  resulted  in  the 
collapse  of  trade  within  the  ex-CMEA.  These  costs  could 
11.  The  specific  features  of  stabilisation  in  post-
communist  economies,  however,  are  well  understood  in  Kolodko 
1990a  and  1991;  see also Nuti,  1991. -23-
have  been at least alleviated if the countries  concerned  had 
been  able  to  agree  on  establishing  free  trade  areas  or  on 
setting  up  sche1nes  for  automatic  trade  clearing  and  mutual 
payments  of  the  type  adopted  through  the  European  Payments 
Union  (EPU)  in  post-War  Europe  (which  would  have  attracted 
Western  aid  just  as  EPU  attracted·  Marshall  aid) .  Keenness 
to  undermine  Soviet  dominance,  to  make  a  clean  break  with 
the  past,  as  well  as  fear  of  delaying  the  more  desirable 
course  of  joining  the  European  Community,  have  resulted  in 
the  otherwise  avoidable  costs  of  trade  collapse  within  the 
ex-CMEA.  Similar  costs  now  might  be  incurred  if  the  ex-
Soviet  republics  failed  to  establish  a  trade  and  payments 
regime  capable  of  handling  their  interdependence  and 
preserving viable trade flows. 
Some  of  the  costs  of  "transition"  have  been  the  result 
of  the  sudden  opening  of  national  economies,  due  to  i)  the 
lack  of  protection  of  those  activities  which  - with  the 
benefit  of  hindsight  - we  now  know  should  have  not  been 
undertaken  in .the· past but,  being there,  were still making  a 
positive  contribution  to  national  income;  ii)  the  related 
costs of  a  speedy convertibility.  Of  course there were  also 
benefits  from  opening  the  economy,  like  the  expected  gains 
in  trade,  competition  and  foreign  investment,  listed  above; 
we  cannot  say  much  about  the  magnitude  or  even  the  sign  of 
the net result. 
Partly,  some  non  negligible  costs  of  stabilisation  and 
reform  plans  undertaken  in  central  eastern  European 
countries  have  been  the  results  of  true  and  predictable 
mistakes,  in  the  narrow  sense  of  decisions·  which  can  be 
proven  wrong  under  any  circumstances,  rather  than  plausible 
"quasi-mistakes"  in  the  sense  of  decisions  which  proved  to 
have  been  inappropriate  only  with  the  benefit  of  hindsight 
and  therefore  can  generate  "surprises"  12.  Using  President 
Bush's  language,  these are "the wrong  kind of mistakes"  13. 
12.  Recently  there  has  been  a  tendency  in  official 
circles  to  recognise  Polish  overshooting  and  the  negative 
phenomena  associated  with  it,  but  to  claim  that  these' had 
been  "surprises"  (see  Gomulka,  1991a  and  1991b)  and  to  dub 
economic  decline  and  unemployment  with  the  dubious 
euphemisms  of  "'creative  destruction"  (Gomulka,  1991b). 
Moreover  Gomu'lka  also  admits  that  "some  of  the  forecasts, 
e.g.  on  prices  and  output,  were  made  under  the  pressure  of 
policy  convenience"  (1991a),  i.e.  were  actually  fabricated. 
One  might  have  been  "surprised",  pe,rhaps,  by · the  results  of 
the  stabilisation plan  in  January  1990,  but  not .in  February 
1990  (when  I  actually haq  the privilege of making  these  same 
points  to  Minister  Balcerowicz),  let  alone  in  April-May 
1991. 
13.  "As  Yogi  Berre  used  to  say,  I  do  not  want  to  make 
the  wrong.  kind  of mistake".  (President  George  ~ush  di~cussing 
with  journalists  .his  cautious  attitude  to. Soviet  crackdown. 
in Lithuania in January  1991). -24-
Thus,  for  instance,  in  Poland  it was  a  mistake  to  let 
real  wages  and  the  real  rate  of  exchange  float  at  random 
with  the  vagaries  of  inflation,  to  excessively  over-devalue 
the  zloty  only  to  let it steadily  overvalue,  to  effectively 
tax  old  loans  by  raising  their  interest  rates,  to  neglect 
farmers'  incomes  and  supply  response,  to  neglect  the  state 
sector,  to  postpone  further  institutional  changes,  not  to 
make  clear announcements  about  further  developments,  to make 
no provision for possible overshooting. 
The  inability  to  recognise  mistakes  and  to  learn  from 
them,  which  was  a  main  drawback  of  the  old  system,  seems 
another  legacy  inherited  by  the  new  system.  What  is  worsef 
central  eastern  European  governments  often fail  to learn  not 
only  from  the  mistakes  of  others,  which  is  true  wisdom,  but 
even  from their own. -25-
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Table  2:  Key  'macroeconomic  variables  in  Central  Eastern 
European  Economies  (percentages) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Rate of  Overall  Inflation  Rate of 
GNP  growth  government  rate  unemployment 
balance; 
/GNP 
1989  1990  1991  1990  1990  1991  1990  1991 
Bulgaria  -0.4  -13.6  -23  -10  65  447*  I  1.6  10 
CSFR  -0.7  - 3.1  -14  - 9  10  58  1.0  8 
Hungary  -0.2  - 5.0  - 7  - 2  30  38  1.7  8 
Poland  -0.2  -12.0  -10  -4  250  60  6.1  11 
Romania  -5.8  -7.9  -18**  -6  40  291*  1.3  4 
Yugoslavia  -6.6  -8.0  -20  n.a.  583  235  13.6  15 
(5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Current  Net  foreign  Foreign 
account  Monetary  debt/hard  exchange 
balance;  overhang  currency  reserves; 
/GNP  exports  /Imports 
1990  Jan  1990  Jun  1991  1990  1990 
Bulgaria  -6.3  small  zero 
CSFR  -2.5  small  zero 
Hungary  0.3  zero  zero 
Poland  1.1  significant zero 
Romania  -4.8  small  small 
Yugoslavia  -7.1  small significant 
* November  (twelve previous months) 
**  industrial output 
497  31 
116  26 
328  19 
408  53 
35  27 
75  34 
Note:  This  table has  been  compiled  from ,official statistical 
sources  and  the  ECE-UN  Economic  Bulletin  for  Europe,  43, 
199,1.  Inflation rates are point-to-point rates of change. - 27-
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